The Kandy King
X Case

I Reported the Crime. They Charged Me.

I'm Anthony Smith. From 2021 I reported to NSW Police that someone was impersonating me online — using my name and photographs across a network of accounts that publicly link to one another and forward to a single handle, @kandykingX. I gave police account links, screenshots, financial traces and correspondence.

NSW Police did not investigate what I reported as cybercrime. Instead, I was the one prosecuted — three times. The first prosecution, in 2022, resulted in two findings of guilt — for distributing two images — while the four remaining charges, and a separate bail-breach matter heard the same day, were dismissed. The images were stills from my own home security cameras, showing the person I had reported inside my apartment. I was fined $500 on each, the minimum penalty the law allowed. The break-in and identity theft that footage documented have never been investigated. The second prosecution, later in 2022, ended in a finding of not guilty after a hearing: the call I was accused of making was attributed to a phone account the carrier confirmed had never been connected to its network — an account I did not know existed — and the officer in charge conceded in writing that the alleged Signal-app call would not appear in those carrier records at all. The third, charged in 2024, was withdrawn and dismissed in 2025 when the complainant refused to give evidence.

This site is not a verdict. It is a record of what I reported, what was done instead, and the documented decisions I am asking to have examined.

If you are a journalist or work for an oversight body, the Documents section sets out the records, and unredacted originals are available on request.

The Disproof Was in the Brief

The Questions This Archive Examines

Each question is examined below with dates, references and documents. The further you read, the more specific the records become.

The Case at a Glance

A chronological spine drawn from records, complaint receipts and correspondence. It is deliberately limited to documented events — the substance of the proceedings against me is dealt with separately. Event and reference numbers can be checked against the source documents in the Records section.

Reported as a Victim. Prosecuted as the Accused.

Between 2020 and 2025 I reported to NSW Police that I was the target of sustained online impersonation and harassment — that someone was using my name and photographs across multiple accounts, including to advertise illicit drugs, and was making false complaints against me. The person I identified operates online as @kandykingX, and under further handles including @frost_rich, @The_real_Tony_smith and @Au_BigFella.

The conduct I reported was not investigated. Over the same period, NSW Police prosecuted me three times. Two of those prosecutions collapsed in court — one a finding of not guilty after hearing, the other withdrawn when the complainant declined to give evidence. The third resulted in two findings of guilt for distributing an intimate image without consent — two stills from security-camera footage of the person I had reported, inside my home — each penalised with a $500 fine, the minimum available, and which triggered a protection order the court had no discretion to refuse. The same police prosecutor, Nicholas Nicolas, appeared in each.

In June 2025, the same day I escalated my complaints to Federal Parliament, a welfare intervention was initiated against me in Queensland. The GIPA records I have since obtained do not record the Triple Zero call said to have prompted it. How that intervention came to be ordered is one of the questions this archive asks.

A Pre-Existing Queensland Record

The events documented on this site take place in New South Wales between 2020 and 2026. They are not the first contact of @kandykingX with the criminal justice system. @kandykingX has a Queensland Magistrates Court record between 2011 and 2019 — five charges across four hearings in Brisbane, including possession of drug utensils (2011), possession of dangerous drugs and utensils (2015), contravention of a Domestic Violence Order (2015 — charge dismissed), and drug-driving with a relevant drug in blood or saliva (2019 — conviction recorded). The full certified record, with magistrate names, case file references, statute citations and outcomes, is set out in the Court Record section at the end of this page.

When NSW Police, beginning in 2021, were assessing complaints involving @kandykingX, the Queensland record above was not visible in their COPS database. The agency was assessing matters without the multi-jurisdictional history. The Queensland record is included on this page not as character evidence but as material context: there was a documented prior history. The current criminal proceedings against @kandykingX in NSW continue that record.

Source: Queensland Magistrates Court records, Brisbane registry; Form 44 Verdict and Judgment Records held in evidence — see Court Record section for case file references.

The Impersonation Network — and the Forensic Report Police Did Not Act On

An account using my name was advertising drug sales and paid drug injection services in Kings Cross — while I was living in Queensland. These screenshots were provided to Kings Cross Police and forwarded, through ministerial correspondence, from a Federal Minister to the NSW Police Minister to the Police Commissioner. The response, returned the same way, was that there was insufficient evidence of identity misuse.

These screenshots appear in GIPA file 925657 and were forwarded through ministerial correspondence — from the office of Federal Minister Tanya Plibersek to NSW Police Minister Yasmin Catley — as part of the complaint detailed in the Weaponised Welfare section below.

For years I gave NSW Police evidence that an online operation was using my identity — my name and my photographs — across encrypted messaging and social platforms, including to advertise the sale of illicit drugs. In 2025 I commissioned a professional forensic investigation by Cybertrace to examine it. The report made findings, and made specific recommendations to law enforcement. They were not acted on.

The Operational Evidence

The Cybertrace forensic report (Ref: 2025-4663) and my collected evidence document the @kandykingX operation in detail. Key elements visible in the public record include:

The "Kandy" Drug Service

The @kandykingX Telegram account operates under the public-facing alias "Kandy" with the bio: "Imported sweets, come join the fray, For girls and boys who party and play! · Kings cross · Open Most Evenings"

Located by referenced address: 84 Darlinghurst Rd, Potts Point NSW 2011.

Peer ID: 7515693902.

Identity-Theft Account

The Telegram account @The_real_Tony_smith uses my name and photographs to advertise drug sales — the same identity that NSW Police charged me with using to "harass" @kandykingX.

Funnel Architecture

The drug service operates a structured customer funnel: Squirt.org profile "RandyManDan" → Telegram @Au_BigFella (referral account with bio noting "This acc is no longer monitored, please contact @kandykingX") → primary @kandykingX drug account.

Sample message captured in the chat logs: "Most of operation haha how do we do it safely. this looks like well can set up so you must have a way of transaction that ensures the seller and buyer are safe from police setups."

Paid Drug Use Service

Documented Telegram offerings include arrangements described as a paid drug-injection service operating from the Kings Cross / Potts Point area, with delivery via Uber Parcel. I provided this evidence to police on multiple occasions.

Forged Banking Records

An ING bank statement was tendered as evidence in earlier proceedings (involving an associated victim) that contained four independent indicators of forgery: duplicate pages with identical transactions, formatting failures on page 3, a missing ten-day period creating mathematical discrepancy, and duplicate government payment reference numbers. NSW Police declined to verify the statement with ING despite the verbal admission of one officer that it "could have but chose not to" do so.

The Cybertrace Forensic Conclusion

The Cybertrace report identified @kandykingX's email address as linked to a Microsoft account created under the name "Anthony Smith" — its clearest attribution finding. The originating ISP and IP address are identified in the report. The report cost me $4,600 and was provided to NSW Police. S/Cst Duncan Handley dismissed it as "incoherent". Kings Cross PAC formally decided "to not investigate further".

Source: Cybertrace Report Ref 2025-4663; Sydney Party Animals Telegram chat logs; Squirt.org capture; Telegram account screenshots; Crime Stoppers reports 996961, 999823, 1002693, 1012217, 1015185.

The De Angeli Acknowledgement

Plain Clothes Senior Constable Joseph De Angeli of Kings Cross Criminal Investigations corresponded with me during November 2024 regarding the Telegram accounts trading on my name and likeness. I had provided detailed evidence including screenshots of @kandykingX's drug-selling Telegram account renamed to "Tony Smith" (@The_real_Tony_smith), pricing for ounce/half-ounce/gram quantities, an MS Teams account opened under my name linked to @kandykingX's gmail address, the @Au_BigFella / @frost_rich master account, and the Squirt.app and Scruff.app cross-referenced profiles.

De Angeli's reply on 29 November 2024 contains three distinct statements, all in the same email.

First — acknowledgement that the alias was in use

Second — refusal to investigate the identity theft as an offence

In the same email, De Angeli set out his reasoning for declining to investigate the identity-theft component under sections 192I, 192J and 192K of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW):

Third — undertaking to refer the drug-supply allegations

The same email closed with a written undertaking to refer the drug-supply component to other officers:

A subsequent GIPA application sought records of any such internal referral being made. The agency response was that no such record was held. The position taken by Superintendent Walters in the subsequent s.132 closure letter of 19 December 2025 — over twelve months later — adopted the same s.192I/J/K analysis as the basis for declining further investigation of the matter at Command level.

The investigating officer with the case in front of him acknowledged in writing that the identity theft was occurring. He simultaneously, in the same email, set out the legal analysis under which it would not be investigated as an offence. He gave a written undertaking that the drug-supply component would be passed to the appropriate unit. NSW Police's own records, accessed under the GIPA Act, do not establish that any such referral was made.

Source: Email from PC Sen Cst Joseph De Angeli (dean1jos@police.nsw.gov.au, extension 40108) to me, 29 November 2024, subject "RE: Urgent Update: Impersonation and Concerns Regarding [name redacted] [SEC=OFFICIAL:Sensitive, ACCESS=Personal-Privacy]". GIPA application response: "Not Held" finding on records of internal referral. Walters s.132 closure letter EXT2025-7535, 19 December 2025.

Inside My Home and Inside My Accounts, at the Same Time

On 16 April 2021 I was rostered from 11:23 to 19:56 and was not home — my roster records the shift. Three days earlier, on 13 April, a location-tracking app (FollowMee) had been installed on my phone without my knowledge. I did not install it.

Across the hours I was at work, my security cameras and my account logs record @kandykingX doing two things at once. The cameras place him in my kitchen at 14:12 and entering my bedroom from 18:55. In the same window my Gmail is searched for "Ike" (17:24) and for attachments (17:42), my Drive is searched for video (17:48), a folder named "Ike" is created and shared to his account (18:39), and his account requests access to it (18:49). The camera footage and the account trail interleave to the minute, placing him inside my home and inside my accounts at the same time.

While that was happening, the surveillance was being shut down from inside the apartment. My bedroom Google Nest camera was switched off at the power board at 17:42, and at 19:12 the power board it was plugged into was unplugged at the wall. Separately, my Apple Photos record shows 483 photographs spanning 25 December 2020 to 6 April 2021 shared to @kandykingX's account (ike.rushton21@gmail.com / ike.rushton22@gmail.com) and then deleted from mine.

The two images later used to convict me are stills from this same record. The prosecution's own charge sheet dated three of its four recording counts to 16 April 2021 — the day documented here. I was found guilty of distributing the record of the intrusion I had reported.

Five days later I told him by message I would recover my photos and documents and consider going to the police. He did not deny the tracking; he dared me to "look the authorities in the face," certain no one would believe me. When I asked him directly about a time-tracking account that had appeared under my email, he did not deny that either.

Source: Tapo and Google Nest camera footage; Google account activity log; Google Drive sharing record (folder "Ike", owner tony.s1969@gmail.com, editor ike.rushton22@gmail.com); Apple Photos shared-album record (483 items, 25 December 2020 – 6 April 2021); FollowMee App Store record (downloaded 13 April 2021); work roster (Line 112 Central Depot, 11:23–19:56), all 13–16 April 2021; SMS exchange with @kandykingX (0433 813 180), 21 April 2021 — held by Anthony Smith. The recording-charge dates appear in the NSW Police Court Attendance Notice, matter H85611724.

I Reported It — and Was Sent Away

From early 2021 I repeatedly reported to NSW Police that @kandykingX was inside my accounts and devices. Those reports are recorded in COPS Event E80847316 at Sydney City Police Area Command. In February 2021 I reported to Inspector Perri Hayes; by July 2021 the record carries my account that he "signs into my Google account externally" and was transferring and deleting my information, that he had reached bank accounts, and that he was reporting me to police first. Each time, I was told the matter could not progress unless I attended and gave a statement.

I tried. In December 2021 I attended Day Street Police Station; in January 2022 I telephoned to report that he was in my Google accounts at that moment. The police record describes me in those encounters as unable to give a statement — "could not provide concise sentences," "muddled," agitated — and states I had been "prescribed anti-depressants." My account of the same encounters differs: I attended and called wanting to make a statement; I was told reports like mine are not taken in person and that I had to lodge them online; on one occasion I was warned that if I did not leave, an ambulance with psychiatric nurses would be called to take me away. I have never been prescribed antidepressants — my Medicare records show it.

When I reported by phone in January 2022, the officer's questions centred not on the intrusion I was reporting but on why I was supposedly contacting @kandykingX. I was not. The call logs recovered when I was later arrested, and the carrier records, show no such calls.

The reports were then closed against me. A later police narrative records that, because I had "been previously charged" over the intimate-image matter (Events E83652754 and H85611724), the agency treated my fraud and hacking reports as already "reported and investigated" and not requiring further action — even as a USB of evidence I had handed in sat checked into the exhibit system (X0001334775). The charges built out of my own harassment complaint had become the reason not to investigate the crimes I was reporting.

Not everyone treated it that way. In April 2023 a Police, Ambulance and Clinician Early Response (PACER) social worker at Sydney City PAC wrote to me describing what I had experienced as "coercion and control … within your relationship," and offered to refer me to a domestic and family violence service.

Source: NSW Police COPS Event E80847316 (Sydney City PAC) — narratives by Insp Perri Hayes (28 February & 7 July 2021), Const Costanza Savini (27 December 2021) and SenCon Ann Sidlo (17 January 2022), released under GIPA; later command narrative recording the "previously charged" basis for declining investigation and exhibit X0001334775; PACER (St Vincent's Hospital) correspondence, 28 April 2023. Held by Anthony Smith.

Three Prosecutions. Three Outcomes.

Three prosecutions. One complainant (@kandykingX). One prosecutor (Nicholas Nicolas). Three OICs (Hammer, Mewburn, Dellenty). In each case, the brief contained evidence directly incompatible with the sworn allegations — and in each case the prosecution proceeded regardless.

In their result, all three were failures of the prosecution. One ended in a finding of not guilty after hearing. One was withdrawn and dismissed when the complainant would not give evidence. And the first — after extraordinary police effort — produced only two $500 fines, for sending two images that were themselves footage of conduct I had reported and police had refused to investigate.

Prosecution 1✓ 5 of 7 Matters Dismissed

Intimate Image Offences & Bail Breach

H85611724 · Charge initiated 24 January 2022 · Kings Cross · OIC/prosecutor: Det Joel Mewburn

Seven matters heard together: six charges in the Brief of Evidence (H85611724) — four of recording an intimate image (s.91P Crimes Act 1900) and two of distribution (s.91Q) — plus a separate bail breach (H392614194) heard the same day. The four recording charges were dismissed — not guilty. The bail breach was dismissed — not guilty. The two distribution charges: findings of guilt, $500 fines each, the minimum penalty, on recklessness as to consent — for sending images to the person I had reported, in correspondence in which I told him I had footage of him using drugs and taking property from my room.

• Officer roles. The Facts Sheet was created by Det Alex Chatfield at 5:58 pm on 24 January 2022. The apprehending officer was Det Elise Chalmers (arrest recorded at 4:50 pm, 24 January 2022); the accepting officer was LSCon Cassandra Grace. Det Joel Mewburn was the officer in charge and prosecutor. The charge was laid at Kings Cross.
• The recording charges were dated to the intrusion itself. Three of the four s.91P recording counts were charged as having occurred on 16 April 2021 — the day my own cameras and account logs record @kandykingX inside the apartment while I was rostered at work (see the 16 April 2021 account). The conduct the prosecution dated to that day was the entry I had reported.
• The fourth recording count was dated 21 January 2021. It concerns footage of @kandykingX taking an item — a gift I had bought for a family member — from a drawer in the apartment, and using drugs at the dining table. I had reported the item missing. The conduct I had reported was recast as something I had unlawfully recorded.
• The images said to support the recording charges were screenshots from @kandykingX's own publicly broadcast Beat Saber gaming livestream, streamed from his Potts Point Central Hotel residence in December 2021 — not covert recordings inside Smith's home in early 2021 as @kandykingX had sworn. The Brief of Evidence itself contains a frame of that broadcast showing @kandykingX signed into the Facebook Live producer (broadcast reference 627999184912424), with the live "End Live Video" control on screen — the source he presented as a hidden camera was his own livestream.
• A Surry Hills detective reviewing the USB exhibit recorded in COPS eleven weeks before the hearing: "police could not find any images that would constitute an offence." The prosecution proceeded regardless.
• The alleged recording dates corresponded to dates on which Smith had made his own victim reports to police about @kandykingX — reports that were not investigated.
• The charges were written into my own complaint. The COPS event behind this prosecution, E83652754, was opened on 5 September 2021 as my report that @kandykingX was harassing me; at that stage police recorded finding "no evidence of any physical threats … or any offence committed by the POI" — the person of interest being me. On 1 January 2022 that event was "combined" with two earlier events, and on the day of my arrest the intimate-image Facts Sheet was written into the same event by the OIC, with the alleged recording dates back-dated to 21 January and 16 April 2021. When I later sought, under GIPA, the separate reports I had made — the 16 April 2021 computer-hacking report and a January 2022 report about a person contacting my employer — the agency located no such separate reports, only this one repurposed event.
• The sworn "withdrawal from the internet." In his statement @kandykingX said he had "removed all trace of myself and my business from the internet" because of reputational harm. The record shows the opposite. On the day of my arrest — 24 January 2022 — he opened the YouTube channel @vrgameplay9609, whose only upload is the Beat Saber clip the recording charges relied on, and a second channel carrying two playlists, one titled "inspiration" and one titled "Fuck You" (last updated 11 April 2022). His business pages and groups stayed online and his accounts continued to grow after the arrest.

Source: NSW Police Brief of Evidence H85611724, including the Facebook Live producer frame (broadcast 627999184912424) showing @kandykingX signed in and broadcasting; Court Attendance Notice and Facts Sheet (H85611724), facts created by Det Alex Chatfield, 24 January 2022 — informant/prosecutor Det Joel Mewburn, apprehending officer Det Elise Chalmers, charging station Kings Cross; Downing Centre Local Court. NSW Police GIPA Notice of Decision GIPAA-2022-0169903 (COPS Event E83652754 — created 5 September 2021 by Const Robert Sly, combined 1 January 2022 by ProCon Connor Rothwell, Facts Sheet added 24 January 2022 by Det Joel Mewburn). YouTube channel records @vrgameplay9609 and i-krush / ike rushton (joined 24 January 2022); @kandykingX witness statement, 18 January 2022. Held by Anthony Smith.

Eleven Grounds of OIC and Prosecutor Misconduct

The third prosecution (H81615839) was dismissed on 10 June 2025 when @kandykingX refused to give evidence. The conduct of the Officer in Charge (OIC Constable Dellenty, Kings Cross PAC) and the prosecutor (Nicholas Nicolas, who appeared in all three prosecutions) is the subject of a standalone exhibit lodged with the Law Enforcement Conduct Commission (LECC CASE20237645/RT). The eleven grounds are summarised below. Each is documented from official records already produced under GIPA or contained in the Brief of Evidence.

The eleven grounds as originally lodged are supplemented in subsequent submissions to the Law Enforcement Conduct Commission with a twelfth ground arising from the 15 March 2026 telephone exchange with Inspector Plummer, in which a Kings Cross PAC Inspector advised me to stop submitting evidence relating to the matters under complaint.

Source: "Standalone LECC Exhibit: OIC and Prosecutor Misconduct in H81615839" lodged April 2026 under LECC CASE20237645/RT.

The bjow_ett Entrapment Account

The third prosecution (H81615839) rested on Instagram messages allegedly sent by me to @kandykingX on 17 and 18 July 2023. The Facts Sheet prepared by OIC Constable Dellenty described the messages as containing "a narrative of Ancient Greece" sent from "an unknown profile" which the victim was "initially unaware" belonged to the defendant.

The documentary evidence establishes:

1. The account was an impersonation. @kandykingX created the Instagram account "bjow_ett" in February 2023 — five months before the alleged messages — using the name and visual identity of a friend I had known in Queensland in 2013. I believed for three months that I was talking to that friend.
2. The friend has confirmed in writing he was impersonated. On 25 December 2024 the friend confirmed in writing: "I've never seen or heard of [@kandykingX]." He confirmed he did not operate the bjow_ett account.
3. The Facts Sheet content was my messages to the impersonator. The "narrative of Ancient Greece" described in the Facts Sheet matches verbatim the messages I sent on 17 July 2023 to the bjow_ett account, believing I was talking to my friend.
4. The OIC was told the account was bjow_ett. I identified the bjow_ett account to OIC Dellenty in writing on 9 June 2024. Dellenty replied "please stop emailing me" on 13 June 2024 and took no investigative action.
5. @kandykingX's surveillance of my account predates the "unknown profile" narrative. @kandykingX's alias account @beat_slaya followed my personal account on 10 June 2023 and liked posts. The bjow_ett account followed seven days later on 17 June 2023. My profile photo had been the same since 2017 — the Facts Sheet narrative that the victim "was initially unaware who the profile belonged to" is contradicted by @kandykingX's own surveillance pattern documented in the brief.
6. The OIC's investigation was structurally barred. Dellenty refused to accept written exculpatory evidence from me. I have documented PTSD and am unable to attend NSW Police stations in person. She insisted I attend Kings Cross Police Station for a recorded interview as the only acceptable form of communication. Written representations were refused as "inadmissible".

Item 7 of the brief index — described as "Documents provided by Victim" — was absent from the brief served on me. GIPA Internal Review REV-2025-0858525 records that Constable Dellenty advised that "upon finalisation of the local court matter some information she had received that was not saved on ViewIMS had been deleted." GIPA 909690 returned "not held" across 13 decision points covering P3 internal records. I hold copies of documents returned as not held. A further GIPA request targeting Item 7 specifically is pending.

Source: Brief of Evidence H81615839; GIPA 909690; GIPA Internal Review REV-2025-0858525.

Source: Brief of Evidence H81615839; my sent email of 9 June 2024 and Dellenty's reply of 13 June 2024; Brenton J. email confirmation of 25 December 2024; Meta Platforms Business Record (in brief).

Same Day to Retaliation

I complained to a Federal Minister at 3:33am. By that same morning, Kings Cross Police had initiated a cross-border welfare check on me in Queensland. GIPA records do not record the Triple Zero call said to have prompted it. In an email to Queensland Health coordinating the check, the Kings Cross officer wrote that the reason he was calling was that "the gentleman has made further complaints to a Federal Ministers Office and I need to respond to them."

On 25 June 2025, I lodged a formal complaint with the office of the Hon. Tanya Plibersek MP — a Federal Cabinet Minister — detailing the Kings Cross PAC's multi-year failure to investigate identity theft, drug trafficking, and hacking by @kandykingX. The documentary record establishes that Kings Cross Police initiated the cross-border welfare referral to Queensland Health on the morning of 25 June 2025 — the same day the complaint was lodged, and before the Plibersek correspondence had even been formally forwarded to the NSW Minister for Police.

The 'Brendan' Email Chain

The email sent by Kings Cross Officer 'Brendan' to Queensland Health on 25 June 2025 contains four demonstrable falsehoods — each contradicted by official records obtained under GIPA or the QLD Right to Information Act.

Queensland Health Clinical Assessment — The Result Official Record

A Matter of Office Telephone Allocation — Extension 40027

Two officers are documented as using the same direct-dial extension at Kings Cross Police Area Command, 1–15 Elizabeth Bay Road, Elizabeth Bay NSW 2011.

The two email signatures present the same Kings Cross PAC extension number. I have lodged a GIPA application seeking the holder or holders of extension 40027 across the relevant period and the rostering records for that line.

The significance of the documentary match is for readers, oversight bodies, and any journalist or lawyer reviewing the case to consider in light of the chronology already established: the cross-border welfare referral to Queensland Health on 25 June 2025 was made within hours of my complaint to the office of a Federal Cabinet Minister, by an officer using the same internal extension as the Professional Standards Duty Officer who, in October 2024, had foreshadowed restrictions on my contact with the command.

Source: Inspector Martha Winch email signature, GIPAA-2025-0943218 InfoLink release. Officer "Brendan" email signature, Queensland Health RTI release JIAU25/13749. Both documents in evidence.

This Was Not Coincidence

Three prosecutions. Same prosecutor. Same complainant. Three OICs. Exculpatory material in each brief before charges were laid. A cross-border welfare referral initiated within hours of a ministerial complaint, citing a Triple Zero call no NSW Police record holds. Administrative shutdowns of evidence submission. Records deleted after prosecution collapsed. This is an operational pattern.

The Oversight Record

The detailed sections of this archive each follow a single complaint through a single body. This section collects them in one place. Each row records who received the matter, what they were asked to examine, the reference number, and the documented outcome — drawn from each body's own correspondence. It is a ledger, not an argument: the dates and reference numbers are the record, and they are set out so the pattern can be read without my having to characterise it.

Read together, the rows show the same matter passing through every tier of NSW administrative oversight — the originating command, a second command, the police complaint system, the independent police-oversight commission, the body that oversees that commission, and the responsible Minister — and closing at each tier without engagement with the documentary record the agencies themselves produced under freedom-of-information law.

What the ledger shows

No tier reached a different result, and none turned on the documentary record. The independent commission referred the matter back to police; the body overseeing that commission declined to look behind its decisions; the Minister's office returned the correspondence to the agency it was about. The records that would resolve the questions — the carrier nil-result, the destroyed case file, the underlying ministerial briefing — were variously certified "Not Held", admitted destroyed, or transferred back to the office under review.

Source: LECC outcome letters 8 November 2023, 25 June 2024, 20 September 2024, 29 October 2024, 28 February 2025, 8 April 2025 and 2 December 2025 (CASE20222615, CASE20235274, CASE20237645, CASE20248756, CASE202411928, CASE202512717); Office of the Inspector of the LECC letter Ref C82-2526/A8579640, 19 May 2026; Sydney City PAC / Superintendent Dunstan closure EXT2025-6654, November 2025; Walters s.132 closure EXT2025-7535, 19 December 2025; Ministerial response F/2025/55291 (29 December 2025) and NSW Police response F/2026/10870 (19 February 2026); GIPA Internal Review REV-2025-0858525; Cabinet Office GIPA transfer under s.45 of the GIPA Act, 19 May 2026. All correspondence held by Anthony Smith; agency copies obtainable directly from each body.

The Closed Loop

On 23 January 2026, I wrote directly to the Hon Yasmin Catley MP, NSW Minister for Police and Counter-terrorism. The correspondence was titled:

The letter set out specific, referenced evidence — drawn from NSW Police's own GIPA releases — documenting three materially false statements made to the Minister's office in earlier briefings. It cited:

• The GIPA-released directive from Inspector Winch declining to investigate (20 September 2024)
• The Commander El-Badawi communication ban (D/2025/201535, 21 February 2025), confirmed "off the books" by GIPA finding "Not Held"
• The Cybertrace forensic report (Ref: 2025-4663), evidenced by GIPA GIPAA-2025-0925592 returning "nil evidence" despite the report having been physically handed to officers
• The QLD Health RTI release (JIAU25/13749) proving the false interstate welfare referral
• The admission in GIPA Internal Review REV-2025-0858525 that the OIC deleted evidence upon finalisation of the local court matter

The Minister's office referred the correspondence to NSW Police Force for response.

NSW Police responded on 19 February 2026 (reference F/2026/10870) under the signature of "Manager, Ministerial and Executive Services". The response addressed not a single piece of the documentary evidence I had supplied. It repeated, in materially the same form, the same claims that had been disproven in the original 23 January correspondence.

The response made no reference to the specific GIPA-disclosed records I had cited, no reference to the QLD Health RTI release, no reference to the Cybertrace forensic report, and no reference to the COPS record destruction acknowledged by the OIC herself.

I replied to that letter addressing the deflection. That reply was not actioned.

What this establishes

The Minister did not see the evidence. The Minister referred the correspondence to the very police force whose conduct was the subject of the correspondence. The police drafted a response on behalf of the Minister that ignored every piece of evidence supplied. The response was sent under the Minister's authority. The political accountability mechanism reflected the police misconduct allegations back at the complainant as "insufficient evidence".

Source: My correspondence to Minister Catley dated 23 January 2026 ("Evidence of False Information Provided to Executive Government"); NSW Police response F/2026/10870 dated 19 February 2026; GIPA application to Office of the Minister for Police via The Cabinet Office, April 2026.

The Contact Ban They Do Not Hold

In February 2025, Kings Cross Police Area Command put my contact with the Command under written restriction. When I later sought the records behind that restriction under the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), the NSW Police Force certified that the records were not held — even though the same unit of the same agency had already released the central document in two other applications, one of them in full. An agency cannot, on the same facts, both not hold a document and disclose it twice.

The restriction — two written instruments

The contact restriction exists in two documents, both of which I hold because both were sent to me:

• 16 February 2025 — Inspector Winch's directive. Writing as Professional Standards Duty Officer at Kings Cross PAC, Inspector Martha Winch instructed me not to contact any staff or officer attached to Kings Cross Police except in an emergency, in which case I was to call Triple Zero.
• 21 February 2025 — the Commander's letter (D/2025/201535). Five days later, D/A Superintendent David El-Badawi, as Commander, wrote that the Command "will not be addressing any further correspondence from you on this matter," directing me to call Triple Zero in an emergency.

Together these are the formal basis on which Kings Cross PAC closed off ordinary contact with me.

The "not held" decision — GIPAA-2025-0834706

On 28 July 2025, InfoLink (Office of the General Counsel) decided GIPAA-2025-0834706. Point 3 of that application sought, in relation to the El-Badawi letter of 21 February 2025, any formal record or document setting out the specific reasons for the decision to restrict my contact with the Command.

The notice records that six commands assisted with the search — Kings Cross PAC, Sydney City PAC, St George PAC, State Crime Command, PoliceLink Command and Professional Standards Command — and that more than eight hours were spent searching police databases, email systems and notebooks. The decision then refused Point 3 under section 58(1)(b) of the GIPA Act, finding the documents relating to the El-Badawi letter were not held. On internal review (REV-2025-0858525), the agency recorded further searches — including a direct search with DCI David El-Badawi himself, the commander who signed the ban letter — and affirmed the "not held" outcome. The commander who wrote the ban could not locate the authorisation record for his own ban.

The same record — released, twice

The document the agency could not locate in GIPAA-2025-0834706 was disclosed to me in two other applications:

• GIPAA-2025-0943218 (decided 16 January 2026, InfoLink). The Schedule of Documents lists, at Item 20, a "Commander's Notice," released in full. That document is the El-Badawi letter of 21 February 2025 (D/2025/201535).
• GIPAREV-2025-0925657 (decided 21 November 2025, InfoLink). The same El-Badawi letter was released as an annexure to that decision.

So within roughly six months, the same unit of the same agency reached opposite conclusions about the same record: not held in one application; released — once in full — in two others.

Why "not held" does not survive scrutiny

The GIPA Act, at section 53(2), requires an agency to undertake such reasonable searches as may be necessary to find the information sought. The agency cited that obligation in the 0834706 notice itself. There are only two ways to read the "not held" finding, and neither rescues it:

• If Point 3 was treated as seeking the El-Badawi letter itself, the finding is simply wrong: the letter is plainly held, because it was released in full in GIPAA-2025-0943218 and again in GIPAREV-2025-0925657. A search that misses a document the same agency releases in two other matters is not a reasonable search.
• If Point 3 was treated as seeking only a separate "reasons" document, then on the agency's own account a Commander imposed a formal, command-wide restriction on a complainant's contact with no recorded reason for doing so — an accountability problem in itself — and, in any event, the letter responsive to Point 3 should have been identified and listed, not the application returned as "not held."

Either way, the contradiction between the three decisions is unexplained.

This is not an isolated finding

The same pattern of "not held" appears across multiple applications. The list is long, and longer still when you count the individual items requested within each application that were not provided:

• GIPAA-2025-0834658 returned an event report (E102149788) from an unrelated February matter, refused as "excluded information" under clause 6. The June welfare check event was not located in this application. It was the subsequent internal review (REV-2025-0858528) that searched COPS and the CAD system for the 25-26 June 2025 period and found no record relating to me.
• REV-2025-0858525 recorded that material received by the officer in charge for the prosecution H81615839 was not saved to the brief-management system and was deleted on finalisation.
• GIPAA-2025-0834706 returned "not held" for records omitted from the brief, metadata for Instagram accounts, investigation reports, running sheets, outcome reports, and the El-Badawi restriction letter authorisation. Only two documents were found: the Facts Sheet and a CIRS outcome email. Everything else was declared not held.
• GIPAA-2025-0943218 listed items as "released in part" but the documents released were not the documents requested. The application sought Winch's assessment records, including her 27 October 2024 response to my DVLO request and the rationale for declining to investigate misconduct. The schedule lists Point 3 as "email correspondence, released in part" but no document dated 27 October 2024 appears in the released pages. The internal assessment records, the reasoning behind the "does not amount to misconduct" determination, and the rationale for the "raise it at court" direction were withheld under clause 1(e). The GIPA is listed as "released" but the specific documents I asked for were not provided.
• GIPAA-2025-0925592 returned "nil evidence" despite the Cybertrace forensic report having been provided to police on 10 June 2025.
• GIPAA-2026-1077027 (active) — Kings Cross PAC has not produced documents to their own InfoLink case officer despite multiple follow-ups. The command is withholding records from the agency's own information access unit.
• GIPA to the Minister for Police — the ban email from Inspector Winch appears near the end of that report, yet the GIPA search could not locate the authorisation record for the ban it released. Inspector Winch's own ban emails were not found through the search process.

Set beside the ban record, these describe an agency whose searches repeatedly fail to locate, or no longer hold, or release something other than what was requested. The pattern is consistent across applications spanning twelve months.

What this calls for

On external review by the Information Commissioner, the points arising are a fresh search under section 53 of the holdings where the El-Badawi letter demonstrably sits (the same holdings that produced it in GIPAA-2025-0943218 and GIPAREV-2025-0925657); a record of who searched, which systems were searched, and how, in GIPAA-2025-0834706 and on its internal review; and a reconciliation of how the same document can be "not held" in one decision and released in two others.

Source: GIPA Notices of Decision GIPAA-2025-0834706 (28 July 2025), REV-2025-0858525, GIPAA-2025-0943218 (16 January 2026) and GIPAREV-2025-0925657 (21 November 2025), all issued by InfoLink, Office of the General Counsel, NSW Police Force; and the contact-restriction correspondence of 16 February 2025 (Inspector Winch) and 21 February 2025 (D/2025/201535, El-Badawi) — held by Anthony Smith.

The Most Recent Documented Officer Position

On 15 March 2026, I spoke by phone with Inspector Plummer of Kings Cross Police Area Command. The call lasted approximately one hour and eight minutes and was a follow-up to a portal complaint lodged five days earlier.

Contemporaneous notes of that call record the Inspector advising me to stop submitting evidence to NSW Police about the conduct documented elsewhere on this site. The Inspector's position, per the notes, was that the police service already held the material and that further submissions were unnecessary.

In the same call, I described — in my own words — the documented destruction of evidence by the Officer in Charge of H81615839 following the dismissal of that prosecution on 10 June 2025: that data the OIC had received "was not saved on ViewIMS and has been deleted." That destruction is independently established by NSW Police's own GIPA Internal Review Notice of Decision (REV-2025-0858525), in which the OIC's admission is recorded by the agency.

This is a Kings Cross PAC Inspector, on the record in a substantial telephone exchange in March 2026, advising a documented complainant to stop submitting evidence relating to ongoing alleged offending — including evidence relating to an officer's destruction of records following a failed prosecution. It is the most recent documented officer position on the matter.

Source: Contemporaneous notes of telephone call between me and Inspector Plummer, Kings Cross PAC, 15 March 2026 (1h 8m duration). Cross-referenced with NSW Police GIPA Internal Review Notice of Decision REV-2025-0858525 (record destruction admission by OIC).

The AVO Asymmetry

The Apprehended Violence Order framework in New South Wales is designed to protect people at risk of family or domestic violence. The documentary record in this matter discloses a pattern of asymmetric application.

@kandykingX's own attempts to bring me under the AVO framework began in December 2020 and failed twice as private applications. NSW Police initiated an order against me only on his third attempt, in January 2022 — this time made by police rather than by him directly. The same framework was not available to me: my own application, made later that year, was refused.

Source: COPS Event records via GIPA disclosure (E88153716, E88695486, E397311094); skip-trace record 164588-1/1 (item 9); my AVO application records; H81615839 court records, Downing Centre Local Court, 10 June 2025; defence solicitor's closing letter, 16 June 2025.

The False COPS Entries

The "Louis" Setup

Two conversations with a building concierge known as "Louis" — a person introduced into the matter by Detective Alex Chatfield — together raise a serious concern. I have set them out here from my own account and a preserved message export.

The first conversation — the "disappearance" offer

The first was in person, in 2022, before my first hearing. Out of nowhere, and contrary to everything else we had been discussing, Louis offered to "make him disappear" — meaning @kandykingX. I suspected a setup immediately. Had I engaged with it, the exchange could have been used as evidence that I was planning serious harm against the person I had reported. I did not engage.

The second conversation — the fabrication instruction

The second came later, by WhatsApp, and referred back to the first. In it, Louis indicated that Detective Chatfield had told him to "make something up" regarding making @kandykingX disappear. I preserved that exchange. It is documentary corroboration of a fabrication request that, until then, had rested on my recollection alone.

What the interaction reads as

The interaction reads in two directions. In one, it points to a detective directing a civilian to fabricate material against the person who had been reporting a crime. In the other, it positions that same civilian to draw me into a conversation that, had I engaged, would have generated grounds for a serious charge against me. I did not engage. I preserved the records and reported them.

Source: My contemporaneous account of the in-person conversation (2022, before the first hearing); WhatsApp export dated 20 February 2025; cross-referenced to COPS Event E83652754 (Detective Chatfield case file establishment, 24 January 2022).

Letter to the Queensland Premier

On 9 March 2026 — nine months after NSW Police deployed Queensland Health as a cross-border instrument of retaliation — a formal letter was sent directly to Queensland Premier David Crisafulli MP demanding a state-level response. The letter was titled: "Queensland Sovereignty and Resident Safety — NSW Police Weaponised Queensland Emergency Services Against a Political Complainant."

The Letter — Key Evidence Points

Four Formal Demands to the Premier

Still Reporting. Still Not Investigated.

In April 2026, @kandykingX faced separate proceedings in regional New South Wales — a committal in matter 2026/00070993, listed at Newcastle Local Court on 22 April 2026, alongside further criminal and police apprehended-violence listings against him on the same daily list.

The current proceedings are a separate domestic violence matter involving a separate complainant. They are not my case. The complainant's identity is not published here.

The relevance to the matters documented on this site is contextual:

1. In January 2022 — a year after NSW Police had been placed on notice of @kandykingX's conduct toward a prior co-occupant, and after two of his own private applications had already failed — NSW Police took an Apprehended Violence Order out against me on @kandykingX's complaint. The Order named @kandykingX as the protected person; I was the documented victim of the impersonation and identity theft that had still not been investigated.
2. When I subsequently applied to NSW Police, Kings Cross PAC, for an Apprehended Violence Order against @kandykingX (approximately September 2022), the application was refused.
3. At the dismissal of the third prosecution on 10 June 2025, the prosecution had been preparing to seek an extension of the protective order in place against me. @kandykingX's failure to attend court that day to give evidence prevented that application.
4. The current April 2026 committal — on a separate complainant's case — proceeds on the basis of the very pattern of conduct I first reported to Kings Cross PAC in 2021 and continuously thereafter, and which Kings Cross PAC declined to investigate.

Contemporaneous Captures — April 2026

In the lead-up to the current committal, contemporaneous evidence I captured records @kandykingX making explicit drug-supply admissions, self-disclosure of recent custody, and surveillance commentary on my identifiers. This material was provided to NSW Police via portal complaint on 19 April 2026 — two days before the committal date.

The NSW Police Response — 14 April 2026

A response from a NSW Police officer dated 14 April 2026 acknowledged in writing the evidentiary value of the material provided:

The same officer stated that the activity falls within Kings Cross PAC's geographical area and was therefore outside the responding officer's investigative capability.

Still Active — June 2026

The conduct I have been reporting since 2021 did not stop. On 19 April 2026 and again on 7 June 2026 I lodged Crime Stoppers and NSW Police Portal reports documenting drug-supply advertising on Telegram tied to the same person, while he was before the Newcastle Local Court and subject to a police apprehended violence application. I lodge through Crime Stoppers and the Portal, and not through Kings Cross PAC, because I am the complainant in LECC matter CASE20237645/RT concerning that command and a contact restriction is in place. The reports exist to create a dated record of intelligence provided to police. The detailed account links, identifiers and forensic attribution are held in those reports and supplied to oversight bodies on request; they are not reproduced here.

The 7 June 2026 report records two developments. First, a public Telegram channel carried a supply advertisement on 3 and 7 June 2026 dividing Sydney into delivery territories and routing the CBD and eastern suburbs to the @t0m_page handle — a permanent Telegram account (ID 8182859141) that has carried the usernames @Alkaios_Market, @Sydney_supply and @t0m_page in succession, and whose profile photograph is the same image used on a flatshare listing under the name “Ike,” a diminutive of @kandykingX’s given name. The username history and the photograph match are recorded in the lodged 7 June 2026 report. Second, the long-running “Party Animals” Sydney group was being closed and migrated to a replacement group restructured into Sydney, Melbourne, Australia and Global sections, carrying a pinned post advising members how to avoid police searches — an organised expansion beyond Sydney.

The attribution tying these accounts to a single operator — shared permanent Telegram IDs and a single mobile number appearing across personas, one of which carries @kandykingX’s own name — is set out in the lodged reports and rests on the Cybertrace forensic report (Ref 2025-4663), a skip-trace reference, and a private investigator’s confirmation. As with the 2021–2025 material, the impersonation accounts that display my name are operated by him and not by me; any NSW Police Central Names Index entry attributing them to me is the product of that identity-pollution pattern.

Source: Crime Stoppers / NSW Police Portal reports lodged 19 April 2026 and 7 June 2026 (Queensland Police Ref QP2600138678); Cybertrace forensic report Ref 2025-4663; skip-trace ref 164588-1/1; private investigator confirmation; NSW Police Force charging records, matter 2026/00070993 (committal); SC Zach Manley email to me, 14 April 2026. Underlying account links and identifiers held by Anthony Smith and supplied to oversight bodies on request.

Promised Contact, No Reply

Separate from the complaints declined on their merits, there is a second pattern in the record: complaints that were acknowledged in writing, given a reference number, and met with an express promise that I would be contacted — after which no contact came. In each instance below the underlying concern about police failure to investigate was never reached, because the promised return of contact simply did not happen.

These are not findings on the substance of what I reported — they are acknowledgements that went nowhere. The letters themselves are in the Documents section below.

On the Record

The following documents are referenced across the prosecutions and the June 2025 retaliation. Each was either present in a brief of evidence, obtained under GIPA or RTI, or produced by a third-party forensic or clinical provider. Where a document is marked exculpatory, it was held by police prior to or at the time of charging.

Formal Proceedings

@kandykingX Continues to Operate

@kandykingX has a Queensland Magistrates Court record between 2011 and 2019 — five charges across four court appearances, all in Brisbane Magistrates Court. The certified copies of orders are below in the order in which they were made.

By December 2021 he was operating from Potts Point Central Hotel in New South Wales. The @kandykingX Telegram drug operation has run continuously from the Kings Cross / Potts Point area since 2020.

On the NSW Local Court daily list for 22–23 April 2026, seven matters were listed against him — four criminal proceedings, including the committal, and three police apprehended-violence applications, each brought by a NSW Police officer. The complainants in those matters are not named here. The criminal listings are publicly searchable under case references 2026/00070993, 2026/00072808, 2026/00123172 and the related police matters; an NCAT appeal in his own name (2025/00114969) was also listed on 14 April 2026. His most recent recorded attendance was on 3 June 2026; the next date had not been published at the time of writing. He has been on bail since 2025.

Source: Certified copies of orders, Brisbane Magistrates Court — case files MAG-00118931/11, MAG-00059357/15, MAG-00066324/15, MAG-00005522/19. NSW Local Court daily list, Newcastle Local Court, 22–23 April 2026 (publicly searchable); NCAT listing 2025/00114969, 14 April 2026. @kandykingX Telegram account ("Kandy"), 84 Darlinghurst Rd, Potts Point NSW 2011 — observable on Telegram.

What I Hold

The documents below are organised by matter. Each entry names the document, its source, and where it is held. Documents marked "held by Anthony Smith" are available to journalists, lawyers, and oversight bodies on request. Redacted versions of those with PDF links are published on this site; unredacted originals are available under controlled access.

Prosecution 1 — H85611724 + H392614194

• Court Attendance Notice — charges 1–4 (recording, s.91P) | Brief of Evidence H85611724
• Court Attendance Notice — charges 5–6 (distributing, s.91Q) | Brief of Evidence H85611724
• Facts Sheet — arrest 24 January 2022, Det Chatfield | Brief of Evidence H85611724
• Statement of Issac Rushton, 18 January 2022 | Brief of Evidence H85611724
• Statement of Police — SC Joel Mewburn, 29 March 2022 | Brief of Evidence H85611724
• Optus subscriber details — service 0433813180 | Brief of Evidence H85611724, Item 6
• Optus call charge records — 0433813180, 20/12/2021–05/01/2022 | Brief of Evidence H85611724, Item 7
• Cellebrite Extraction Report 1 (email accounts) | Brief of Evidence H85611724, Item 8
• Cellebrite Extraction Report 2 (emails to Rushton) | Brief of Evidence H85611724, Item 9
• Cellebrite Extraction Report 3 (photographs) | Brief of Evidence H85611724, Item 10
• Email exhibit — maytheforth1995@gmail.com, 7 January 2022 | Brief of Evidence H85611724, Item 4
• Text message photograph — 22 December 2021 | Brief of Evidence H85611724, Item 3
• Bail breach facts sheet — H392614194 | Held by Anthony Smith ↓ View / download PDF

Prosecution 2 — H91613788

• COPS event E89340266 — original report, Con Hammer, 19 June 2022 | Held by Anthony Smith
• COPS event E89743926 — bail compliance, Sgt Barlow, 24 July 2022 | Held by Anthony Smith
• COPS event E92324688 — SCC Cybercrime Squad, Det Saywell, 28 July 2022 | Held by Anthony Smith ↓ View / download PDF
• COPS event E86657020 — Surry Hills fraud report, April 2022 | Held by Anthony Smith
• Criminal History Bail Report — outcome: dismissed not guilty after hearing | Held by Anthony Smith
• iMessage — Con Marcel Hammer to Anthony Smith, 7 August 2022 | Held by Anthony Smith ↓ View / download PDF
• Optus letter — service 0468828365, nil call records, 12 July 2022 | Held by Anthony Smith
• Anthony Smith email to police forwarding Optus records, 25 July 2022 | Held by Anthony Smith

Prosecution 3 — H81615839

• Brief of Evidence index — Item 9 present, Item 7 absent | Brief of Evidence H81615839, held by Anthony Smith
• Telstra carrier record — Item 9, Subscriber/CCR, Total Result Count: 0 | Brief of Evidence H81615839 ↓ View / download PDF
• GIPA 909690 — "not held" across 13 decision points | NSW Police GIPA response
• GIPA Internal Review REV-2025-0858525 — Dellenty admission re deleted information | NSW Police ↓ View / download PDF
• Solicitor's letter confirming dismissal — Wilson Tighe, 16 June 2025 | Held by Anthony Smith
• Pending: GIPA return targeting Item 7 specifically | NSW Police — outstanding

Oversight and GIPA

• LECC Inspector decision — Bruce McClintock SC, 19 May 2026 | CASE20237645 ↓ View / download PDF
• GIPA Notice of Decision — 20240549728 | NSW Police ↓ View / download PDF
• GIPA Notice of Decision — 925657, pages 107–121 | NSW Police ↓ View / download PDF
• GIPA Notice of Decision — 943218 | NSW Police
• Communication ban — Directive D/2025/201535 | Held by Anthony Smith ↓ View / download PDF
• RTI release — Queensland Health welfare referral | JIAU25/13749 ↓ View / download PDF
• GIPA Internal Review — GIPAREV-2025-0925657 | Under consideration
• GIPA Internal Review REV-2025-0858528 — no Triple Zero record; Steptoe "very unusual" assessment | NSW Police ↓ View / download PDF
• Inspector Winch communication ban emails (5 instances, Sep 2024 to Feb 2025) | GIPAA-2025-0943218 ↓ View / download PDF
• GIPAA-2026-0970012 | NSW Police

Forensics and Impersonation Evidence

• Cybertrace forensic report | Ref 2025-4663 ↓ View / download PDF
• Microsoft Teams account — "Anthony Smith," created 12 November 2024, linked to ike.rushton22@gmail.com | Cybertrace Ref 2025-4663
• Telegram evidence — nurse account | GIPA 925657
• Telegram evidence — party group | Ministerial correspondence
• @kandykingX profile image | Held by Anthony Smith

Get in Touch

If you have experienced similar conduct by NSW Police or Kings Cross PAC, have information relevant to this case, or are a journalist or researcher covering police accountability — please reach out. If you have had contact with the individual operating as @kandykingX, @beat_slaya, @The_real_Tony_smith, or @Au_BigFella on Telegram, I would particularly like to hear from you.

NSW Police misconduct can also be reported to the Law Enforcement Conduct Commission (LECC) at lecc.nsw.gov.au or the NSW Ombudsman at ombo.nsw.gov.au. RTI requests to QLD Health can be made at health.qld.gov.au.

Corrections Policy

This archive is a documentary record. Accuracy is its purpose. If an error is found — a wrong date, a misstated reference number, a misattribution — it will be corrected promptly and the correction will be logged below.